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Abstract
1. The importance of economically dominant farmers is increasing in
the lease market for agricultural land.  This is particularly evident from the
NSS data of 1981-82 and 1991-92 on the percentage of operational hold-
ings and operated area under tenancy and on the shares of large farmers
in total tenanted holdings and tenanted area.  Increase in the significance of
large farmers in the lease market is a disquieting development because:
m Taking advantage of tenancy laws the farmers can get conferred
ownership or occupancy rights on tenanted lands under their control.
m They can take advantage of the laws and cause hardship to petty
lessors (landlords) and, in particular, to institutional lessors.
m They can displace petty peasants from the lease market.
m They can expose poor tenants to a process of self-exploitation by
vying with them for land in the lease market.
2. The once isolated incidents of the practice of large farmers taking
land on lease by now (1991-92) spread to new regions and got intensified in
certain others.  Thus in the states of AP, Assam, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala,
Punjab, Rajasthan, and to a lesser extent in MP, UP and TN large farmers
have become a force to reckon with in the lease market.
3. The modus operandi of large farmers seeking to edge-out their com-
petitors in the lease market is that they offer rent in fixed cash, invariably at
the beginning of the season, to their lessors in return for the lease of land.
The farmers appeal to the compulsions of the lessors for secure rental
receipts by offering to pay fixed cash rents.  Petty peasants, being less able
to do so, lose out to these farmers in competition for tenanted land.3
4. The  increasing  dominance of large tenants does not, however,
appear to be at the expense of the poorest of the poor marginal tenants.
Although marginal tenants got dislodged in some states consequent upon
an increase in the importance of large  tenants  between 1981-82 and 1991-
92, there are also states where both classes of tenants secured greater
hold on the lease market.  The proportions of holdings and area under ten-
ancy with large farmers and  those with marginal  farmers  bear no relation-
ship whatever in the 1991-92 cross-section data of major states.  But it
should not come as a great relief, for it is possible that marginal tenants are
now obliged to pay higher rents than earlier in trying to stay in competition
with large tenants.
5. The notion that the  costliness of new technology compels poor peas-
ants to voluntarily  opt out of the lease market  and  the resultant increase in
the supply of land  for  lease enables large farmers to gain ascendancy in
the lease market has little support in the data of recent times.  There is only
one state, Haryana, where the increase in the real cost of cultivation be-
tween 1981-82 and 1991-92 culminated in a decrease in the hold of mar-
ginal farmers and a simultaneous increase in the importance of large farm-
ers in  the  lease market.  The cost  factor  is  also  found unimportant in
influencing the leasing behaviour of marginal farmers even when the cross-
section data of Indian states pertaining to 1991-92 is examined.  The peas-
ants do not appear to be opting out, rather, they are being driven out.
6. High wage rates seem to favour mechanization of farming opera-
tions and with it the operation of large holdings.  Farmers who are con-
strained to increase their ownership holdings because of ceiling laws are,
therefore, making their way into the lease market for agricultural land.
7. The entry of large farmers into the lease market may further capital-
ist development in the agricultural sector.  But in the process numerous
prospective tenants from the poorer sections can get distanced from the
lease market.  The institution of land tenancy which derives its legitimacy
on the ground that it would help poor peasants to gain access to tenanted
land and thereby would fulfill their hope of advancing on the agrarian ladder4
will be of no avail.  It can also give rise to a situation where, petty tenants, in
trying to compete with large tenants for tenanted land will end up paying
rents higher than the usual to their landlords.  Besides, sooner or later, the
process can have a dampening effect on real wages of agricultural labour
and can stunt the growth of rural employment.
8. Therefore,  it seems important to make tenancy laws sufficiently
stringent to restrict the entry into the lease market only to petty peasants.
The quantitative significance of the incidence of tenancy among large farm-
ers is high enough, though in a relative context, to enact and enforce such
exacting laws.  The  surplus land  distributed  in  the  country  up  to Septem-
ber, 1991 was 19.48 lakh hectares while the tenanted land under the control
of large farmers (with operated land in excess of 10 hectares) as of 1991-
92 was 21.63 lakh hectares.  Apart from the land leased-in by this class of
farmers there is also the land which was leased-in by other relatively  higher
classes of farmers.  And  what  is  more,  even the NSS estimates of land
under lease, though are on a far higher side compared to the leased-in land
as per Agricultural Census, are admittedly underestimates themselves.  By
preventing  large farmers from entering into the lease market, it should be
possible to bring down inequity in the distribution of operated land, an objec-
tive which is sought to be achieved by allowing tenancy.  Such a step is also
desirable in the interest of wages and employment in the agricultural sector.
Also, as a means to increase the access of land to the rural poor, the policy
of barring large farmers from the lease market assumes importance, in
view of the closing-in of the possibilities to acquire and distribute land ac-
cruing on account of ceiling laws.
9. In sum, it is necessary to rid the large tenant of the lease market in
the interest of the poor peasant, who yearns to lease-in a piece of land.  The
notion that the petty peasant is opting out of the lease market because of
costliness of new technology seems unfounded.  The peasant is not opting
out, rather the large farmer is forcing him to withdraw from the market by
appealing to the need of his lessor for secure rental receipts and by paying
him rent in fixed cash.  It is in the interest of the large farmer to drive out the
petty cultivator from the lease market and thereby gain control over it, be-5
cause mechanization of farming operations, in the context of high wages, is
making heavy demands on him to expand the size of his operational hold-
ing.  With the scope to enlarge the ownership holding having decreased,
more because of the deterrent effect of the land ceiling laws, the large farmer
has no option but to lease-in land to expand the size of holding to put his
capital assets to optimum use.  Large farmers may contribute to capitalist
development in agriculture.  But development of capitalist relations may
lead to proletarianisation of large sections of the rural working classes.
The author  wishes to acknowledge with thanks the comments by V.N. Reddy
and S. Subrahmanyam on an earlier draft of this paper.6
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1. Introduction
What is the economic standing of cultivators participating in the lease market
for agricultural land?  Are they all petty peasants?  These questions deserve
serious attention for the reason that tenancy laws in the States, even after
several amendments, still seem to be based on the premise that tenants as
a class are of low economic standing and, therefore, if cultivators of large
size-class could gain control over tenanted land, they would not serve the
purpose for which they are meant, to promote equity, or would even prove
counter-productive (Vyas, 1970, A73; Nadkarni, 1976, A139; Haque and
Sirohi, 1986, 136-41; Gill, 1989, A84). The Congress Agrarian Reforms
Committee (AICC, 1949) provided guidelines to States in the formulation of
tenancy laws in the early years of Independence based on this very premise
(Murty, 1987). Even the later day revisions to the laws have not quite
incorporated clauses to make it difficult for the big tenants to enter the lease
market.
We have evidence to state that some tenants, even in the past, were drawn
from better-off sections and tenancy laws, as they were ill-equipped to deal
with such situations, favoured them.  Consider the much acclaimed land-
to-the-tiller policy of Kerala (which came into force on 1 January, 1970 and
the provisions of which had been implemented in the next ten years).  It
made no distinction between those who only supervised cultivation
(ostensibly, the well-off tenants) and those who contributed their own and
their family members' labour in cultivation while identifying the true tillers of
land and the right of purchase of ownership rights was conferred to all.  As
a consequence, the benefits of the reform accrued to the upper strata of
tenants operating their holdings with hired labour (Herring, 1983, 183; Raj
and Tarakan, 1984, 46; Haque and Sirohi, 1986, 55).  Again, in West Bengal,7
another State which has always been in the forefront of land reforms, the
middle peasants were reported to have got disproportionate benefits in
tenancy reforms under 'Operation Barga' campaign initiated in 1978 (Ghose,
1984, 120).
Even in the general course a big lessee leasing-in land from a petty lessor
could, by virtue of his greater bargaining strength, ensure that the terms
and conditions governing lease agreements are favourable to him.  The
study by Bharadwaj and Das (1975, 221-40) in eleven villages of Orissa
and the work of Vyas (1970) in Gujarat bear testimony to this.  And, if tenancy
laws protect such a tenant, he could use his privileged position to cause
hardship to his petty landlord.  In such a case, the laws, contrary to their
stated objective of promoting equity, might as well aid inequity.  Operating
from a position of vantage the big tenant of an institutional lessor could work
to undermine the interests of the lessor.
Since land ceiling laws are more often evaded than abided, the size
distribution of ownership holdings is highly concentrated.  Little can be done
about it in the existing social, economic, political and juridical set up (Joshi,
1974; Parthasarathy and Rao, 1969).  However, if tenancy laws can restrict
the entry into the lease market only to petty peasants the size distribution of
operational holdings can be made much less concentrated than that of
ownership holdings.  In a way, the institution of tenancy gains legitimacy for
this reason.  An open and regulated tenancy is propagated on the assumption
that it would make some of the petty peasants to advance on the agricultural
ladder (Vyas, 1970).  But Raj (1970, 2) in his seminal and pioneering work
based on the NSS data of 1954-55 points out that tenancy laws did not quite
serve the purpose and therefore the size distribution of operational holdings
differed only by a limited degree from that of land ownership because of the
practice of leasing-in by large tenants.  There are several later day studies,
based both on secondary and primary data that go to show that better-off
sections among the peasantry have gained access to the lease market and
as a result the very purpose of tenancy laws is getting distorted.
Thus, for instance Bardhan (1976, 1543-44) based on the NSS data of 1960-
61 and 1970-71 states that there was distinct shift away from the smaller
tenants leading to a concentration of tenancy.  He cites the Punjab situation
in particular.  Laxminarayan and Tyagi (1977, A77) on an examination again
of the same set of data reach the conclusion that more land area was leased-8
in by large land holders (cultivators operating 4.05 hectares or more of land)
than small ones.  Vyas (1970) in Gujarat, Bandopadhyay (1975) for West
Bengal, Gill (1989, A79-85) from the census data of 1970-71 and 1980-81
for the Punjab, Nadkarni (1976, A137-45) based on a census survey of six
villages of Maharashtra and Singh (1989) again from field data pertaining to
the Punjab, Rao (1992), and Haque and Parthasarathy (1992)  all reach the
conclusion that large tenants have emerged in the lease market, specially
in regions characterized by agricultural progress, commercialization of
agriculture, and farm mechanization and what is more, they are displacing
the smaller cultivators.





 round), 1981-82 (37
th
 round) and 1991-92 (48
th
 round) pertaining to the
significance of large tenants, the 48
th
 round NSS report on operational
holdings (GoI, 1997, 29-30) notes that there has been a rise in the percentage
of holdings and area under tenancy, particularly in the 'large' size category
(with operated land in excess of 10 hectares) in 1991-92, breaking the
downward trend between 1960-61 and 1981-82.  It is all the more intriguing
that "the inverse relationship which had prevailed between the size of holding
and the percentage of leased-in area (to total operated area) for two decades
since 1960-61 seems to have disappeared with the large holdings reporting
the highest proportion (11.4%) of leased-in operated area in 1991-92."
Thus the some what isolated incidents of the big cultivators leasing-in
observed in the past in different parts of the country assumed sizeable
proportions now (by 1991-92, the latest year for which data on landholdings
is available from NSS) as to get manifested in the aggregate data pertaining
to all India.  This could either be because of the spread of the practice to
many States, intensification in the States where it has been prevalent before
or both.  As noted, the increase in the significance of large farmers in the
lease market is a disquieting development because:
u Taking advantage of tenancy laws the farmers can see that ownership
and occupancy rights on tenanted lands under their control are
conferred on them.
u They can take advantage of the laws and cause hardship to petty
lessors and, in particular, to institutional lessors and undermine their
interests.
u They can displace petty peasants from the lease market.9
u They can expose poor tenants to a process of self-exploitation by
vying with them for land in the lease market.
Raj (1970, 2) and, keeping the conditions obtaining in the Punjab (including
Haryana) in mind, Bardhan (1976, 1543-44) and later Singh (1989, A87)
make the point that the capacity of the landless or the small owner to lease-
in land is greatly reduced in an environment characterized by increased
costliness and credit-intensity of new agricultural technology dependent on
privately controlled irrigation, purchased inputs, in the context of a highly
imperfect credit market.  The changed environment is noted to make
available more land for lease to cultivators with the capacity to acquire costly
inputs.  But mere supply of more land for lease need not get translated into
demand if those capable of taking it on lease have no desire for it.  However,
demand is emerging from the bigger farmers.  Those who are desirous of
expanding their size of holdings through purchase of land but are unable to
do so following land ceiling legislation, are satiating their demand by taking
land on lease (Vyas, 1970).  And better-off cultivators are inclined to lease-
in land because the increase in the unit of cultivation made possible by
leasing-in of land enables the farmers to more adequately utilize their modern
technical inputs.  That is, the big farmers lease-in to optimize the use of
capital resources (Singh, 1989, A86-88; Nadkarni, 1976, A144; Bliss and
Stern, 1982).  Meanwhile, those migrating to urban centres prefer to lease-
out to farmers with significant means as they would be better able to take
proper care of their lands and pay rents promptly (Vyas, 1970).
2. Objectives
Thus, the questions raised and analysed in the literature on large tenants
are: (1) Why do larger farmers wish to enter the lease market or why do
they demand tenanted land?  Agricultural progress, commercialization of
agriculture and farm mechanization are noted to explain the phenomenon.
(2) Why do petty peasants give up leased-in land under their control or
where does the supply of tenanted land emerge from?  The high cost of
cultivation is seen as the factor making poor tenants to opt out of the lease
market.  The objectives of the present study are shaped by the relative
neglect of the treatment of four important issues in the literature on large
tenants.  The study seeks:
1. To provide an answer to the question as to how large farmers get10
ascendancy over their rivals in the lease market?
2. To examine whether large farmers edge-out the poorest of the poor
marginal farmers on their entry into the lease market.
3. To test the hypothesis that high cost of cultivation dislodges marginal
farmers from the lease market and the resultant increase in the supply
of land for lease enables large farmers to gain greater hold over the
market.
4. To empirically answer the basic question as to why large farmers enter
the lease market?
3. Methodology
The study is based on the NSS data on operational holdings corresponding
to the years 1981-82 (37
th
 round) and 1991-92 (48
th
 round).  The data of
1981-82 is accessed from 'Sarvekshana' (GoI, 1988) and that corresponding
to 1991-92 is drawn from the NSS Report No. 407 (GoI, 1997).  Admittedly,
the problem of under estimation plagues the two important secondary data
sources on tenancy, viz., Agricultural Census and  NSS. Of the two, NSS is
by far the more reliable and therefore we employ the data emerging from
this source in the paper.  Again, although the definitions of certain terms
used in the NSS landholding surveys had changed from time to time, those
of the years chosen here, 1981-82 and 1991-92 have not (Estimates of
tenanted holdings and area under tenancy for these years could be lower
because in rounds prior to 1981-82 "otherwise possessed" land was not
shown separately, and therefore part of this land might have got included in
the leased-in land in earlier rounds).
Data of only 15 major states is used in the study, barring in the regression
exercises and in the analysis relating to cost of cultivation.  West Bengal is
omitted from regression exercises (used to explain the inter-State variations
in the incidence of tenancy among large tenants) because tenancy reforms
in the State under Operation Barga spilled into the 1980s, the period of our
study, and effectively curbed the emergence of large tenants there.  Next,
as estimates of cost of cultivation are not available for Kerala, because
plantations and orchards account for 58.5% of operated land in the State, it
gets ignored in the related analysis.11
The decade of 1980s, the period under study, assumes importance in that
it is during this phase that technological developments in the form of HYV
seeds, chemical fertilizers and pesticides have become highly popular as
to cause agricultural growth in the country to reach a record 3.5% per annum
on an average.  The period  1981-82 to 1991-92 was also marked by the
absence of fresh initiatives to enforce tenancy laws, except in West Bengal,
where the Operation Barga programme was started in late 1970s and which
continued, though with much less vigour (following the directive from the
High Court that involving the party cadres in registering tenants should be
stopped) into the 1980s.  The furor created by a spate of revisions to the
laws in the early 1970s following the need for urgently revising the land
reform laws voiced by the Task Force on Agrarian Relations (PC, 1973)
might have been responsible, at least in part, for the decline in tenancy
between 1970-71 and 1981-82.  But as years rolled by and as people began
to realize that the laws would not be enforced and important provisions
contained in them would forever remain in the book, the lease market became
active again.  This might have caused some increase in the incidence of
tenancy between 1981-82 and 1991-92.  But this does not explain the
increase in the incidence of tenancy among large farmers.
The main focus of the study is on 'large' tenants.  The appropriate first step,
therefore, is concerning the definition of the 'large' tenant.  There are two
issues here.  First, are we to define 'large' tenant based on the size of his
owned area or operated area?  In the literature on tenancy one finds scholars
taking both the sides.  Parthasarathy (1991, A31) defines the size of the
tenant based on his owned area and finds that the lease market was
generally characterised by petty peasants and the phenomenon of large
landowners taking land on lease was only an aberration.  His approach to
the NSS 1981-82 data on ownership holdings shows that of the total tenanted
holdings the landless, marginal and small farmers accounted for 91.56%
and of the total tenanted area that under the control of these farmers formed
70.59%.  Those owning 10.13 ha. and above were no more than 0.30%
among those leasing-in land and their share in tenanted area was 2.78%
(Table - 1).  Contrarily, there is the claim that the economic status of a
tenant would be better reflected by his wealth position and since the wealth
status is difficult to arrive at even in micro-level studies, the land operated
by him could be employed in its stead.12
Consider, for example, the extreme case of prospective tenants with no
land of their own.  On entry into the lease market it is not necessary that all
of them lease-in an equal extent of land.  Some will lease-in more, while
others less.  No doubt, to an extent, those who lease-in more can do so only
because they allow themselves to be exploited more by their landlords -
they may be obliged to pay higher rent than the usual.  But is it also not true
that they lease-in more because they have greater capacity to lease-in by
virtue of their access to more non-land resources, such as credit, cattle,
farm machinery etc.?  Those opting to take more land on lease must
obviously be having a greater access to credit may be because they are in
a position to pledge gold, hypothecate a house etc., to secure loans.  They
may also be in a position to invest the surpluses accruing to them from
other ventures, in the cultivation of tenanted land.  The better the wealth
position of a tenant, the more will be the land he will lease-in (supposing that
the capacity to lease-in is backed up by the desire to do so).  The same
logic can extended even to tenants with some owned land.  Tenants with
equal extent of owned land will not all have equal capacity to lease-in.    Thus
leasing-in of land will also be dictated by the non-land assets owned by the
farmer.  Bharadwaj and Das (1975, 222), Raj (1970, Tables - 2, 3 and 4) and
Bardhan (1970, Table - 2) among others have used operational holding to
classify tenants as belonging to small or large size-class.
If we define, as we do in this paper, the economic status of tenants on the
basis of the operational holding of tenants, the share of the near landless,
marginal and small farmers in total tenanted holdings, as in 1981-82, was
75.58% while their share in the tenanted area was merely 35.12% (Table -
1).  The operational holdings with land 10.13 ha. and above constituted 1.44%
of those leasing-in and their share in leased-in area was 13.46% (Table - 1).
These observations are quite in contrast to the ones drawn from the
classification of tenants based on household ownership holding.  From the
above we can see that the conclusion one reaches on the quantitative
significance of large tenants will depend upon the yardstick one adopts to
assess the size-class of tenants.  And, obviously, this will have a bearing on
policy.  If the extent of leased-in land under the control of large tenants is
limited, there is no case for intervening in the lease market for the express
purpose of getting rid of the tenants from the market.
The second issue is that the problem does not end with the choice of the
yardstick against which we classify a tenant as belonging to a low or a high13
economic status.  We still have to decide on the extent of land a tenant
should operate for him to be called a better-off tenant.  What all we can say
is that the better-off tenant should 'operate' a 'sizeable' extent of land.  The
term 'sizeable' defies clear definition and in this paper we mainly highlight
the incidence of tenancy among tenants operating more than 10.00 ha. of
land.  Following the accepted practice in NSS publications, these tenants
are referred to here as tenants of large category.
We have to contend with changes in the class-intervals between the NSS
data of 1991-92 and 1981-82.  For instance, the 'large' size category of
1991-92 envelops those operating 10.01 ha. and above, whereas in 1981-
82 (and earlier) the cultivators of 'large' size are defined as those having
operational holdings 10.13 ha. or more.  There is no longer any attempt to
make the size categories defined in hectares in 1991-92 to correspond to
those defined in acres in earlier surveys.  In our tabulations we ignore these
differences and make no adjustments to the data. Mention may however be
made that the 'marginal' operational holdings have been defined in both
1981-82 and 1991-92 in the same way.
State-wise estimates of weighted average cost of cultivation per hectare
are arrived at for the years 1981-82 and 1991-92 using the data available in
'Cost of Cultivation of Principle Crops' (GoI, 1991, 2000). It may be noted
that cost estimates are not always reported for these years in respect of all
crops.  Where they are not, we have expressed the available estimates at
1981-82 and 1991-92 prices.  Again, estimates of costs are not available for
all the crops grown in a State, the cost estimates are not comprehensive.
The area under the crops for which data on costs is available is never 100%
(for the year 1991-92 the coverage ranges between 83.54% in UP and 49.73%
in Karnataka, whereas for the year 1981-82 it ranges between 82.94% in
MP and 48.54% in Maharashtra) and, because area under the crops is used
as weights to arrive at the cost of cultivation in a State, the cost estimates
are far from comprehensive.  Estimates of costs are available for different
definitions of cost.  We have considered cost A2 here (It basically includes
all the paid-out costs of the cultivator including the rent paid for leased-in
land besides the values of owned bullock and machine labour, farm produced
seed and owned manure and depreciation on implements and farm
buildings).14
There are alternative ways of looking at the quantitative significance of large
tenants from the data on operational holdings. These are:
1) Percentage of operational holdings leasing-in from among large
farmers.
2) Percentage of operated area leased-in by large farmers.
3) Percentage share of large farmers in total holdings leasing-in.
4) Percentage share of large farmers in total leased-in area.
Variables 1 and 3 pertaining to the significance of tenanted holdings of large
category could yield divergent figures if, for instance, an increase in the
tenanted holdings is counter balanced by an increase in operational holdings
having no tenanted area.  The same logic applies to the variables 2 and 4
pertaining to tenanted area of large tenants.  They could lead to opposite
conclusions as well.
4. Changes in Holdings Leasing-in and Area leased-in  Among Large
Farmers
At the all India level, the proportion of operational holdings reporting leasing-
in fell, substantially at that, from 15.20% to 10.99% between 1981-82 and
1991-92.  The fall could be observed in respect of all size categories of
holdings except in the large one, where the proportion increased from 11.6%
to 16.7%.  The increase in their proportion at the national level is the result
of similar increase in 8 of the 15 major States.  The practice of large farmers
looking to lease-in land spread to MP, Rajasthan, UP and AP.  Earlier on the
significance of the farmers was low in these States.  Also, the practice got
intensified in Assam, Haryana, Kerala and Punjab.  In the States of Karnataka,
Maharashtra and TN the practice seems to be on the decline, but still
important. The total absence of large tenants that one notices in West Bengal
should be attributed more to the Operation Barga programme than to any
other factor.  As in 1991-92, the large farmers leasing-in land formed a very
high percentage in Haryana, 82.2%, and Assam, 78.7% (Table - 2).
The values of the correlation coefficient, a summary measure indicating the
statistical relationship between the size of operational holding (the mid-points
of class-intervals are taken to represent the size) and the percentage of
operational holdings under tenancy, are worked out both for 1981-82 and15
1991-92 for the individual States to see if there is a systematic relationship
between the two variables in question.  The value of the  coefficient in 1981-
82 was negative and significant for all India.  But by 1991-92 it turned positive,
although not significant.  The relationship between size and operational
holdings leasing-in turned positive and significant in 5 states by 1991-92
while none existed in them earlier in 1981-82.  The States are Assam,
Haryana, Kerala, Maharashtra, and Rajasthan.  In Punjab, the relationship
has all along been positive and significant.  These are the States where the
incidence of tenancy is increasing with increase in the size of operational
holding.  In Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar
Pradesh, although the relationship between size and the percentage of
holdings under tenancy was not systematic to be significant, there has been
an increase in large tenants here over time (Table - 3).
All classes combined, leased-in area's significance in operated area
increased over time, from 7.2% in 1981-82 to 8.3% in 1991-92 at the all
India level.  It was much more so in the case of large farmers where the
proportion increased from 5.3% to 11.4%.  Considering individual States,
we find that the proportion in respect of these farmers increased markedly
in Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Haryana, Kerala and Punjab.  As in 1991-92,
the percentage of operated area leased-in by large farmers was very high in
Haryana, 70.5%, Assam, 65.1%, and Kerala, 50.6% (Table - 4).
Does the operated area under tenancy increase with increase in size?  And
how important is this relationship in the two years under study?  The negative
and statistically significant correlation that existed at the all India level in
1981-82 between the variables in question vanished by 1991-92.  This is
the outcome of changes taking place at least in 5 States, viz., Assam,
Haryana, Kerala, Maharashtra and Punjab.  In all these States the once
non-existent relationship or even a negative one (as in Haryana) in 1981-82
turned positive and significant by 1991-92 (Table - 3).
5. Changes in the Shares of Large Farmers in Tenanted Holdings and
Tenanted Area
The share of farmers of the large category in tenanted holdings increased
during the decade of the 1980s from 1.4% to 2.0% at the all India level.  At
the level of individual States, the share of the tenants increased in 7 of the
15 States.  The increase was remarkably high in Haryana, with the share16
increasing from 4.0% in 1981-82 to 19.0% in 1991-92.  The increase in the
share of large farmers in tenanted holdings cannot but be low because
unemployment or underemployment forces many poor peasants to vie for
land in the lease market.  These peasants yearn to acquire even a toe hold
of land and with it hope to climb up the agrarian ladder (Table - 5).  But more
important than the increase in the large farmers' share in tenanted holdings
is the increase in their share in tenanted area.  Their share in the area
increased from 13.5% to 20.9% between the two points of time.  Their share
recorded an increase in as many as 9 of the 15 States.  The share of large
farmers was as high as 64.7% in Haryana.  It was closely followed by
Rajasthan, where the share was 45.2% (Table - 6).
Employing the distributions of tenanted holdings and tenanted area the gini-
coefficient of concentration of tenanted area is calculated.  At the all India
level the coefficient declined during the decade of 1980s.  There are, however,
4 States where the coefficient recorded an increase.  The States are Assam,
Haryana, Karnataka and Maharashtra (Table - 7).
6. How Do Large Tenants Edge-out Their Competitors?
Analysis of the State level data brings out the fact that in the States of Andhra
Pradesh, Assam, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Punjab,
Rajasthan and to a lesser extent in Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and
Tamil Nadu large tenants have become a force to reckon with.  How do the
large farmers edge out those who compete with them in the land lease
market?  It appears that these farmers appeal to the need of the lessors for
secure rental receipts by offering them fixed money, invariably in the beginning
of the season, in return for lease of land.  Petty peasants being less able to
do so will lose out to large farmers in the competition for tenanted land.  The
NSS data unambiguously shows that in almost all the States where there
was an increase in the dominance of large tenants during the decade of
1980s there was also an increase in the significance of land leased-in by
the tenants under fixed cash terms.
Consider these figures.  At the all India level, during the decade of 1980s
while the proportion of operational holdings leasing-in among large farmers
increased from 11.6% to 16.7%, the holdings leased-in by these farmers for
fixed money as a proportion of holdings leased-in under all terms increased
from 18.99% to 47.54%.  The increase in the proportion of operated area17
leased-in by large farmers from 5.3% to 11.4% was again accompanied by
an increase in the proportion of area leased-in for fixed money, as against
fixed kind, share produce etc., from 11.26% to 35.49%.  Likewise, as the
share of large farmers in leased-in holdings increased from 1.4% to 2.0%
the corresponding figure for them in the total land leased for fixed cash rose
from 2.46% to 4.10%.  Finally, while the share of farmers of large category
in leased-in area shot up from 13.5% to 20.9% between 1981-82 and 1991-
92, the share of the farmers in the area leased-in for fixed cash increased
from 13.95% to 39.06% (Table - 8).
7. Are Marginal Farmers Affected by the Entry of Large Farmers in the
Lease Market?
We may raise here another related question that has a bearing on the equity
issue.  Are the farmers of marginal category (those with less than 1.01
hectares of operational holding) divested of tenanted holdings/tenanted area
because of the increasing significance of large farmers in the lease market?
If this indeed is the development, it should be condoned in order that the
spirit of the tenancy laws is upheld.  The proportion of holdings under tenancy
with marginal farmers declined from 14.4% in 1981-82 to 9.3% in1991-92
(Table - 2). The proportion of area under tenancy with the farmers also
declined, though marginally, from 9.7% to 8.7% during the period (Table - 4).
The shares of the farmers increased both in tenanted holdings and tenanted
area.  While the former increased from 52.9% to 53.2% the latter rose from
15.6% to 16.3% (Tables - 5 & 6).  Thus, at the all India level, even as holdings
and area under tenancy with marginal farmers declined, the shares of the
farmers in tenanted holdings and area remained more or less the same.
A cross-classification of States is attempted based on the observed changes
in the magnitude of large and marginal tenants during the period under study.
There are four ways of looking at the relative importance of the two categories
of tenants in line with the four tenancy variables we are working with.
Correspondingly we have four tables.  Along the rows we show the increase
or decrease (including no change) in the significance of large tenants, and
in the columns we show the increase or decrease in the importance of
marginal tenants.  Should the entry of large farmers into the lease market
displace marginal farmers, the observations/States should find their way
into the top right hand corner of the tables (Tables - 9 to 12).  We notice that
Haryana was by far in the most undesirable position.  Here there was not18
only an increase in the incidence of tenancy among farmers of large category,
but it was also accompanied by a decrease in the incidence of tenancy
among farmers of marginal category.  Holdings under tenancy with the
marginal farmers declined in AP, Assam, Kerala, UP and Punjab besides
Haryana, while the holdings under tenancy with large farmers increased
(Table - 9).  In Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan both categories of tenants
were found to have grown in importance (Tables - 9 to 12).
The percentage of holdings and area under tenancy with large farmers and
those with marginal farmers bear no relationship in the cross-section data
of 1991-92.  The correlation between the large farmers' share in tenanted
holdings  and the marginal farmers' share is found to be negative and sizeable
(-0.70) in 1991-92 data.  The corresponding correlation when the share of
tenanted area is also negative and sizeable (-0.63) (Table - 13).
Over all, the increasing dominance of large tenants does not appear to be
at the expense of the poorest of the poor marginal tenants.  Although marginal
tenants got dislodged in some states consequent upon an increase in the
importance of large tenants between 1981-82 and 1991-92, there are also
states where both classes of tenants secured a greater hold on the lease
market.   But it should not come as a great relief, for it is possible that
marginal tenants are now obliged to pay higher rents than earlier in trying to
stay in competition with large tenants.
8. Does the Cost of Cultivation Influence the Leasing Behaviour of
Marginal Farmers?
It is hypothesized that costliness of new technology compels marginal
farmers to voluntarily opt out of the lease market and the resultant increase
in the supply of land for lease enables large farmers to gain greater hold
over the market.  To view the likely changes in the real cost of cultivation
between 1981-82 and 1991-92 we have adjusted the cost estimates using
the general consumer price index of agricultural labourers.  Then, a cross-
classification of States is attempted based on changes in the real cost of
cultivation and in the significance of marginal farmers (Tables - 14 to 17).
Only 13 States are considered here, West Bengal and Kerala being the
omitted ones.  If we consider holdings under tenancy with marginal farmers,
it is in the States of AP, Assam, Bihar, Haryana, and Orissa that the increase
in the cost occurred at the same time when there is a decline in the proportion19
of marginal farmers (Table - 14).  Consideration of area under tenancy shows
that in States of AP, Assam, and Haryana, the proportion of leased-in
operated area of marginal farmers decreased when the cost increased (Table
- 15).  Working with shares of marginal farmers in tenanted holdings and in
area we find that only in Haryana an increase in cost was associated with a
decline in the significance of marginal farmers (Tables - 16 & 17).
For the hypothesis to be valid an increase in the cost should be accompanied
by a decrease in marginal tenants and a simultaneous increase in large
tenants.  In order to see whether the changes of the type are taking place,
we juxtaposed the above results against the results obtained from the cross-
classification of States based on relative changes in the incidence of tenancy
among large and marginal farmers (Tables - 2 & 4 and 5 & 6). We notice
that there is only one State, Haryana, where this happened, irrespective of
the way we define the significance of the tenants.  AP and Assam show
similar features, but only in two of the four definitions of the tenants'
significance.  The cost factor is found to be largely  unimportant in influencing
the leasing behaviour of marginal farmers even in the cross-section data of
1991-92 (Table - 18).  It, therefore, appears that at least the marginal tenants
do not seem to be opting out of the lease market on their own because of
the cost factor.  The hypothesis is invalidated.
9. Why Do Large Farmers Enter the Lease Market?
Employing the NSS data of 1991-92 we seek here to examine if the factors
generally contended to give raise to the emergence of large tenants do in
fact capture the inter-State variations in their significance using a multiple
and a simple regression model, both of linear form.  Three aspects are
relevant in this context: Number of observations, alternative definitions of
the dependent variable-significance of large tenants, number and definitions
of independent variables.  As regards the first, the number of observations,
we have decided to leave out West Bengal from the data of 15 major States
we are working with so far, for the reason that, following the launching of
Operation Barga programme and its continuation into the 1980s, large
tenants became extinct in the State (whether they emerge in future, as they
have in Kerala even after the implementation of land-to-the-tiller policy is
anybody's guess).  The dependent variable is defined in the same ways as
we have along been doing in the study: Percentage of operational holdings
leasing-in from among the large farmers, percentage of operated area leased-
in by large farmers, percentage share of large farmers in tenanted holdings20
and percentage share of large farmers in tenanted area.
The independent variables, as they emerge from the survey of literature
presented above, are farm mechanization, commercialization of agriculture,
and agricultural development.  It is pointed out that as agriculture becomes
more and more mechanized with associated use of tractors, pump sets, oil
engines, harvester combines and the like, there would be a need to put the
machines to optimum use.  In order to do so, leasing-in of land might become
necessary for the farmers possessing these capital assets. The more the
capital assets the greater might be the need to lease-in especially when the
possibility to expand one's holding trough purchase of land exhausts.
Therefore, we expect the significance of large tenants to be more in States
where agricultural mechanization has taken deep roots.  The regression
exercises should yield a positive coefficient to this variable.  We have defined
this variable in two alternative ways: Number of tractors per lakh hectares
of gross cropped area (1991-92; CMIE, 1999) and average wage rate (1991-
92; GoI, 1992) of male agricultural labour (ploughmen or field labour in
agriculture).  The understanding in using the 'wage rate' is that when it is
high it will favour farm mechanization and with it the operation of large
holdings.  In any case the correlation between the 'number of tractors' and
'wage rate' is found to be quite high at 0.70.
Where agriculture is highly commercialized, that is where what is produced
on the farm is mainly for the market and where the outlets for marketing the
surplus produce are abundant, large farmers may be prompted to enter the
lease market and carry out production along capitalist lines (with hired labour,
with intensive use of high yielding inputs and with the main aim of selling the
surplus produce in the market).  The variable is expected to appear with a
positive sign in the regressions.  We have employed two variables to capture
the degree of commercialization in the States: Percentage of area under
non-food crops to total cropped area and  number of wholesale assembling
markets per one crore worth of agricultural output of major crops.  The
choice of the variable 'area under non-food crops', though employed in two
of the regressions, is not quite justifiable for the reason that, for instance in
Punjab the share of area under the crops is no more than 24.8%, yet it is
common knowledge that the State is among the most commercialized
regions of the country.  In the ultimate analysis the variable commercialization
of agriculture is dropped from the final forms of the regression model as it is
found, given the way it is defined here, to be not only not significant but21
generally yielded a t - value less than 1.00 (Gujarati, 1988, 227).
In agriculturally developed regions large farmers were noted to be
predominant in the literature.  The promise of better returns should normally
egg any cultivator to lease-in land in such regions.  The more rewarding the
cultivation, the more could be the land taken on lease.  Even large farmers
might do so if there are no diseconomies of scale.  When agricultural
progress of a State is used as an explanatory variable in our regressions, it
should yield a positive coefficient.  In our regression exercises we sought to
work with average gross state domestic product originating in agriculture
per hectare for the triennium ending 1992 (EPWRF, 1998).
We present the results of two regression models - one a linear multiple one
(Set I, Table - 19) and the other a simple linear model (Set II, Table - 20).
The first set seeks to explain the variations in the 4 alternative forms of the
dependent variable, the incidence of tenancy among the farmers of large
size category, using 'GSDP' and 'number of tractors' as the explanatory
variables.  The second set employs 'wage rate' as the only explanatory
variable.  It is not combined with any other variable like, for instance, 'per
hectare GSDP' or 'per hectare value of output' for reasons of multicollinearity.
One general point is that both the regression models, in all their forms, as
seen from the values of F, are good fits to the data and therefore the results
assume importance.
The results of the regression model with the explanatory variables 'average
per hectare GSDP from agriculture' representing agricultural development
and 'number of tractors per lakh hectares' indicating degree of mechanization
of farming operations (Set I, Table - 19) shows that agricultural development
has a positive and significant influence on the percentage of operational
holdings and area leased-in by large farmers.  However, its influence on the
share of large farmers in tenanted holdings and area is not significant.  On
the other hand, mechanization has a positive and statistically significant
influence on the share of large farmers in tenanted holdings and area even
though its influence on the percentage of operational holdings and area
leased-in by large farmers is not significant.
As a next step, we worked with the simple linear regression model taking
the 'wage rate' as the explanatory variable (Set II, Table - 20).  There is an
important commonality in the results -- the variable turned out to be positive22
and statistically significant.  This goes to suggest that large farmers, when
faced with a situation of high wages for labour, obligingly mechanize their
farm operations and in the process find it necessary to operate larger
holdings than they own.
Thus wage rate (and a little less assuredly tractorization) is the all important
factor explaining the inter-State variations in the magnitude of large tenants.
Higher the wage rate, higher is the large tenants' control over the lease
market.  Farmers who are constrained to increase their ownership holdings
because of land ceiling laws are making their way into the lease market for
agricultural land (Table - 21).  Between 1981-82 and 1991-92, the average
area owned by large farmers recorded a decline from 15.87 ha. to 15.29 ha.
indicating that there are limits to expanding the ownership holding.  But,
may be with the demands to put the capital assets to optimum use mounting,
the farmers are found leasing-in more on an average in the later year than in
the former.  The average leased-in area which was 0.85 ha. in 1981-82
more than doubled to 1.75 ha. by 1991-92 (Table - 21).
10. Conclusions
The entry of large farmers into the lease market may further capitalist
development in the agricultural sector.  But in the process numerous
prospective tenants from the poorer sections can get distanced from the
lease market.  The institution of land tenancy which derives its legitimacy
on the ground that it would help poor peasants to gain access to tenanted
land and thereby would fulfill their hope of advancing on the agrarian ladder
will be of no avail.  It can also give raise to a situation where, petty tenants,
in trying to compete with large tenants for tenanted land will end up paying
higher rents than usual to their landlords.  Besides, sooner or later, the
process can have dampening effect on real wages of agricultural labour
and can stunt the growth of rural employment.
Therefore, it seems important to make tenancy laws sufficiently stringent to
restrict the entry into the lease market only to petty peasants.  The quantitative
significance of the incidence of tenancy among large farmers is high enough,
though in a relative context, to enact and enforce such exacting laws.  The
surplus land distributed in the country up to September, 1991 was 19.48
lakh hectares while the tenanted land under the control of large farmers
(with operated land in excess of 10 hectares) as of 1991-92 was 21.63 lakh23
hectares.  Apart from the land leased-in by this class of farmers there is
also the land which was leased-in by other relatively higher classes of farmers.
And what is more, even the NSS estimates of land under lease, though are
on a far higher side compared to the leased-in land as per Agricultural
Census, are admittedly underestimates themselves (Sawant, 1991; Sanyal,
1977).  By preventing large farmers from entering into the lease market, it
should be possible to bring down inequity in the distribution of operated
land, an objective which is sought to be achieved by allowing tenancy in
principle.  Such a step is also desirable in the interest of wages and
employment in the agricultural sector.  Also, as a means to increase the
access of land to the rural poor, the policy of barring large tenants from the
lease market assumes importance, in view of the closing-in of the
possibilities to acquire and distribute land accruing on account of ceiling
laws.  With the near exhaustion of the waste land available for distribution,
this is one means by which the land hunger of the poor can be satisfied to
some extent.
In sum, it is necessary to rid the large tenant of the lease market in the
interest of the poor peasant, who yearns to lease-in a piece of land.  The
notion that the petty peasant is finding it difficult to lease-in land because of
costliness of new technology seems unfounded.  The peasant is not opting
out of the lease market, rather the large farmer is forcing him to withdraw
from the market by appealing to the need of his lessor for secure rental
receipts and by paying him rent in fixed cash.  It is in the interest of the large
farmer to drive out the petty cultivator from the lease market and thereby
gain control over it because mechanization of farming operations, in the
context of high wages, is making heavy demands on him to expand the size
of his operational holding.  With the scope to enlarge the ownership holding
having decreased, more because of the deterrent effect of the land ceiling
laws, the large farmer has no option but to lease-in land to expand the size
of holding to put his capital assets to optimum use.  Large farmers may
contribute to capitalist development in agriculture. But development of
capitalist relations may lead to proletarianisation of large sections of the
rural working classes.24
Table - 1
Percentage Distribution of Tenanted Holdings and Area by
Size-class of Owned and Operated Area of Tenants:1981-82
Broad size category (ha.) P. C. distribution based P. C. distribution
on HH. ownership based on HH.
holdings operational holdings
Number Area Number Area
Marginal (less than 1.01) 81.80 52.68 52.87 15.56
Small (1.01 - 2.02) 9.76 17.91 22.71 19.56
Semi-medium (2.03 - 4.04) 5.66 13.75 14.83 23.86
Medium (4.05 - 10.12) 2.48 12.88 8.15 27.56
Large (10.13 & above) 0.30 2.78 1.44 13.46
All classes 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table - 2
Percentage of Operational Holdings Leasing-in
Among Large and Marginal Farmers
State Large farmers Marginal farmers All classes
1981-82 1991-92 1981-82 1991-92 1981-82 1991-92
Andhra Pradesh 13.9 22.0 10.8 10.4 13.3 14.1
Assam 20.1 78.7 8.7 7.9 12.4 10.1
Bihar 2.9 0.0 16.7 5.7 18.8 5.6
Gujarat 7.7 1.2 7.3 3.0 4.9 3.7
Haryana 30.4 82.2 9.2 4.5 25.6 17.1
Karnataka 14.4 10.2 5.7 5.5 10.4 8.0
Kerala 31.6 60.3 6.5 4.9 6.3 5.2
Madhya Pradesh 3.4 10.9 5.4 6.7 7.6 9.0
Maharashtra 14.2 12.1 11.6 5.6 10.3 6.9
Orissa 11.3 4.6 15.3 14.2 17.4 16.4
Punjab 42.3 47.6 10.6 7.3 20.1 15.9
Rajasthan 6.2 10.2 5.0 5.6 6.8 6.5
Tamil Nadu 25.6 16.3 23.9 14.1 22.8 15.3
Uttar Pradesh 9.6 20.5 17.3 12.6 20.1 15.5
West Bengal 43.5 0.0 21.8 13.3 21.8 14.4
All India 11.6 16.7 14.4 9.3 15.2 11.025
Table - 3
Correlation Between Size and (1) P. C. of Holdings Leasing-in and
(2) P. C. of Area Leased-in
State Size Vs P. C. of holdings Size Vs P. C. of area
leasing-in leased-in
1981-82 1991-92 1981-82 1991-92
Andhra Pradesh -0.11 0.46 -0.59 0.21
Assam -0.13 0.92* -0.25 0.91*
Bihar -0.71* -0.76* -0.70* -0.84*
Gujarat 0.71* -0.44 0.74* -0.53
Haryana 0.09 0.99* -0.60* 0.97*
Karnataka 0.38 0.56 0.05 0.42
Kerala 0.19 0.96* 0.21 0.91*
Madhya Pradesh -0.26 0.36 -0.33 -0.74
Maharashtra 0.30 0.78* -0.08 0.95*
Orissa -0.44 -0.66 0.63* -0.83*
Punjab 0.71* 0.84* 0.11 0.88*
Rajasthan 0.02 0.71* -0.01 0.37
Tamil Nadu -0.51* 0.17 -0.62* -0.64
Uttar Pradesh -0.53* 0.36 0.32 -0.88*
West Bengal -0.84* -0.78* 0.71* -0.86*
All India -0.59* 0.66 -0.51* 0.5626
Table - 4
 Percentage of Operated Area Leased-in By Large and Marginal Farmers
State Large farmers Marginal farmers All classes
1981-82 1991-92 1981-82 1991-92 1981-82 1991-92
Andhra Pradesh 3.6 13.6 7.7 10.7 6.2 9.6
Assam 8.0 65.1 5.2 7.0 6.4 8.9
Bihar 0.0 0.0 13.6 6.2 10.3 3.9
Gujarat 3.7 0.2 2.4 2.9 2.0 3.3
Haryana 14.0 70.5 18.6 6.5 18.2 33.7
Karnataka 4.0 7.3 3.7 5.4 6.0 7.4
Kerala 13.8 50.0 2.6 2.1 2.1 2.9
Madhya Pradesh 1.0 3.2 3.1 7.8 3.6 6.3
Maharashtra 4.7 8.3 4.6 3.3 5.2 5.5
Orissa 26.9 0.3 10.0 11.1 9.9 9.5
Punjab 14.9 26.7 10.6 17.3 16.1 18.8
Rajasthan 3.9 6.2 3.4 6.5 4.3 5.2
Tamil Nadu 7.5 8.0 16.7 10.8 10.9 10.9
Uttar Pradesh 9.5 6.7 12.1 11.2 10.2 10.5
West Bengal 64.1 0.0 13.3 13.2 12.3 10.4
All India 5.3 11.4 9.7 8.7 7.2 8.327
Table - 5
Percentage Share of Large and Marginal Farmers in Total Holdings
State Large farmers Marginal farmers All classes
1981-82 1991-92 1981-82 1991-92 1981-82 1991-92
Andhra Pradesh 3.1 1.3 39.6 43.8 100 100
Assam 0.2 1.5 42.3 55.3 100 100
Bihar 0.1 0.4 61.3 77.9 100 100
Gujarat 6.2 0.8 58.4 39.4 100 100
Haryana 4.0 19.0 15.1 13.3 100 100
Karnataka 5.0 2.9 21.0 33.9 100 100
Kerala 0.3 0.1 92.5 87.1 100 100
Madhya Pradesh 1.6 3.0 23.2 28.7 100 100
Maharashtra 7.6 5.3 39.7 35.5 100 100
Orissa 0.5 0.1 48.1 52.2 100 100
Punjab 5.2 5.1 31.0 29.2 100 100
Rajasthan 6.7 11.2 22.2 34.0 100 100
Tamil Nadu 0.3 0.3 75.0 70.8 100 100
Uttar Pradesh 0.3 0.4 51.3 55.5 100 100
West Bengal 0.2 0.6 74.3 74.7 100 100
All India 1.4 2.0 52.9 53.2 100 10028
Table - 6
Percentage Share of Large and Marginal Farmers in Total Area Leased-in
State Large farmers Marginal farmers All classes
1981-82 1991-92 1981-82 1991-92 1981-82 1991-92
Andhra Pradesh 13.2 13.4 12.7 19.6 100 100
Assam 1.7 18.7 18.1 26.9 100 100
Bihar 0.0 0.0 30.7 45.9 100 100
Gujarat 40.3 1.1 7.9 7.4 100 100
Haryana 13.7 64.7 3.8 1.0 100 100
Karnataka 16.1 18.7 3.6 7.0 100 100
Kerala 13.0 6.4 57.8 38.9 100 100
Madhya Pradesh 5.7 8.4 4.1 8.3 100 100
Maharashtra 26.4 30.9 3.2 4.0 100 100
Orissa 33.9 0.1 17.2 25.8 100 100
Punjab 18.2 22.4 2.6 5.7 100 100
Rajasthan 32.8 45.2 2.8 7.0 100 100
Tamil Nadu 3.3 3.7 34.2 28.7 100 100
Uttar Pradesh 6.0 2.7 21.5 26.6 100 100
West Bengal 12.1 0.0 31.4 50.7 100 100
All India 13.5 20.9 15.6 16.3 100 10029
Table - 7
Gini-coefficients of Concentration of Leased-in Land
State 1981-82 1991-92












Tamil Nadu 0.68 0.57
Uttar Pradesh 0.51 0.41
West Bengal 0.60 0.35
All India 0.63 0.56
Table - 8
Increase in the Significance of Fixed Cash Tenancy Among
Large Farmers: All India
Incidence of fixed cash tenancy 1981-82 1991-92
P. C. of holdings under fixed cash tenancy to total 18.99 47.54
tenanted holdings (11.80) (23.23)
P. C. of area under fixed cash tenancy to total 11.26 35.49
tenanted area (10.86) (18.97)
P. C. share of large tenants in total holdings under 2.46 4.10
fixed cash tenancy (100) (100)
P. C. share of large tenants in total area under 13.96 39.06
fixed cash tenancy (100) (100)
          Figures in brackets indicate percentages applicable to all tenants30
Table - 9
Cross-classification of States Based on Relative Changes in the
Incidence of Tenancy among Large vis-à-vis Marginal Farmers:
(1) Holdings Reporting Leasing-in
States where p. c. of States where p. c. of holdings leasing-in
holdings leasing-in among marginal farmers
among large farmers
Increased between 81-82 Decreased between 81-82
and 91-92 and 91-92
Increased between MP, Rajasthan AP, Assam, Haryana,
81-82 and 91-92 Kerala, UP, Punjab,
(All India)
Decreased between Bihar, Gujarat, TN,
81-82 and 91-92 Karnataka, Maharashtra,
Orissa, WB
Table - 10
Cross-classification of States Based on Relative Changes in the Incidence
of Tenancy among Large vis-à-vis Marginal Farmers: (2) Area Leased-in
States where p. c. of States where p. c. of holdings leasing-in
operated area leased- among marginal farmers
in by large farmers
Increased between 81-82 Decreased between 81-82
and 91-92 and 91-92
Increased between AP, Assam, Karnataka, Haryana, Kerala,
81-82 and 91-92 MP, Punjab, Rajasthan, Maharashtra,TN
(All India)
Decreased between Gujarat, Orissa Bihar, UP, WB
81-82 and 91-9231
Table - 11
Cross-classification of States Based on Relative Changes in the
Incidence of Tenancy among Large vis-à-vis Marginal Farmers :
(3) Shares in Tenanted holdings
States where p. c. share States where p. c. share of
of large farmers in  marginal farmers in tenanted holdings
tenanted holdings
Increased between 81-82 Decreased between 81-82
and 91-92 and 91-92
Increased between Assam, Bihar, MP, Haryana,
81-82 and 91-92 Rajasthan, UP, WB,
(All India)
Decreased between AP, Karnataka, Orissa Gujarat, Kerala,
81-82 and 91-92 Maharashtra,
Punjab, TN
Table - 12
Cross-classification of States Based on Relative Changes in the
Incidence of Tenancy among Large vis-à-vis Marginal Farmers:
(4) Shares in Tenanted Area
States where p. c. share States where p. c. share of
of large farmers in  marginal farmers in tenanted holdings
tenanted area
Increased between 81-82 Decreased between 81-82
and 91-92 and 91-92
Increased between AP, Assam, Karnataka, Haryana, TN
81-82 and 91-92 MP, Maharashtra,
Punjab, Rajasthan,
(All India)
Decreased between Bihar, Orissa, UP, WB Gujarat, Kerala,
81-82 and 91-9232
Table - 13
Correlation Between the Leasing Behaviour of Large and  Marginal
Tenants
Correlation between Correlation coefficient
P. C. of operational holdings reporting leasing-in -0.17
among large tenants and that among marginal
tenants
P. C. of operated area leased-in among large
tenants and that among marginal tenants -0.10
P. C. share of large tenants in tenanted holdings and
that of marginal tenants -0.70
P. C. share of large tenants in tenanted area and that
of marginal tenants -0.63
Table - 14
Cross-classification of States Based on Changes in Real Cost of
Cultivation and in the Significance of Marginal Farmers:
(1) Holdings Leasing-in
States where real States where p. c. holdings leasing-in
cost of production  among marginal farmers
Increased between 81-82 Decreased between 81-82
and 91-92 and 91-92
Increased between MP, Rajasthan, AP, Assam, Bihar,
81-82 and 91-92 Haryana, Orissa
Decreased between Gujarat, Karnataka,
81-82 and 91-92 Punjab, Maharashtra,
TN, UP33
Table - 15
Cross-classification of States Based on Changes in Real Cost of
Cultivation and in the Significance of Marginal Farmers:
(2) Area Leased-in
States where real States where p. c. of operated area leasing-in
cost of production  among marginal farmers
Increased between 81-82 Decreased between 81-82
and 91-92 and 91-92
Increased between MP, Orissa, Rajasthan AP, Assam, Haryana
81-82 and 91-92
Decreased between Gujarat, Karnataka, Bihar, Maharashtra,
81-82 and 91-92 Punjab TN, UP
Table - 16
Cross-classification of States Based on Changes in Real Cost of Cultivation
and in the Significance of Marginal Farmers:
(3) Shares in Tenanted Holdings
States where real States where p. c. share of marginal farmers in
cost of production  tenanted holdings
Increased between 81-82 Decreased between 81-82
and 91-92 and 91-92
Increased between AP, Assam, Bihar, MP, Haryana
81-82 and 91-92 Orissa, Rajasthan
Decreased between Karnataka, UP Gujarat, Maharashtra,
81-82 and 91-92 Punjab, TN34
Table - 17
Cross-classification of States Based on Changes in Real Cost of
Cultivation and in the Significance of Marginal Farmers:
(4) Shares in Tenanted Area
States where real States where p. c. share of marginal farmers in
cost of production  tenanted area
Increased between 81-82 Decreased between 81-82
and 91-92 and 91-92
Increased between AP, Assam, Bihar, MP, Haryana
81-82 and 91-92 Orissa, Rajasthan
Decreased between Karnataka, Maharashtra, Gujarat, TN
81-82 and 91-92 Punjab, UP
Table - 18
Correlation Between the Leasing Behaviour of Marginal Tenants and
Cost of Cultivation
Correlation between cost of cultivation and Correlation
coefficient
P. C. of operational holdings leasing-in among marginal farmers 0.20
P. C. of operated area leased-in by marginal farmers 0.48
P. C. share of marginal farmers in total holdings leasing-in 0.04
P. C. share of marginal farmers in total leased-in area -0.0935
Table - 19
Factors Explaining Inter-State Variations in the Extent of
Large Tenants: Results of Multiple Linear Regression: Set - I
Definitions of dependent Intercept Regression R square
variable coefficients of [F - value]
GSDP No. of
tractors
P. C. of operational holdings -26.163 0.006* 0.007 0.521*
leasing-in among large farmers (-1.505) (2.747) (0.976) [5.992]
P. C. of operated area leased- -25.562 0.005** 0.003 0.455**
in by large farmers (-1.583) (2.577) (0.565) [4.597]
P. C. share of large farmers in 4.173 -0.000 0.004* 0.488**
total tenanted holdings (1.222) (1.065) (3.236) [5.242]
P. C. share large farmers in 16.390 -0.001 0.013** 0.351***
total tenanted area (1.203) (-0.654) (2.429) [2.979]
Figures in (  ) are t - values.
* Significant at 1% level,  ** Significant at 5% level,  *** Significant at 10% level
Table - 20
Wage Rate as a Factor Explaining Inter-State Variations in the Extent of
Large Tenants: Results of Simple Linear Regression: Set - II
Definitions of dependent Intercept Regression R square
variable  coefficients [F - value]
of wage rate
P. C. of operational holdings -32.944*** 2.273* 0.537*
leasing-in among large farmers (-1.947) (3.730) [13.914]
P. C. of operated area leased- -30.349*** 1.876* 0.482*
in by large farmers (-1.949) (3.344) [11.186]
P. C. share of large farmers in -4.994 0.329** 0.312**
total tenanted holdings (-1.275) (2.332) [5.437]
P. C. share large farmers in -13.467 1.153** 0.305**
total tenanted area (-0.960) (2.292) [5.254]
Figures in (  ) are t - values.
* Significant at 1% level,  ** Significant at 5% level,  *** Significant at 10% level36
Table - 21
Details Relating to Large Farmers: All India (Rural)
(>10.00 ha. for 1991-92 and >10.12 for 1981-82)
Sl. Indicators of large farmers' significance 1981-82 1991-92
No.
1 Number holdings (lakhs) 13.45 12.34
2 Number holdings leasing-in (lakhs) 1.56 2.06
3 Area owned (lakh ha.) 213.49 188.67
4 Area leased-in (lakh ha.) 11.46 21.63
5 Area operated (lakh ha.) 215.93 190.23
6 Average area owned (ha.) 15.87 15.29
7 Average leased-in area (ha.) 0.85 1.75
8 Average operated area (ha.) 16.05 15.42
9 P. C. of operational holdings under tenancy 11.60 16.70
10 P. C. of operated area under tenancy 5.31 11.37
11 P. C. share of large farmers in tenanted holdings 1.44 2.01
12 P. C. share of large farmers in tenanted area 13.46 20.8837
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